Rate Hikes, COVID, Cuts — How Australia’s Property Ladder Held Up in Five Capital Cities
We tracked 250,000 moves over 6 years across Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth between 2020 and 2025 to measure whether Australians were moving up or down the property ladder each quarter. The results tell a very different story for each city.
13 min read
Key takeaways
- Melbourne is the only Australian capital where the property ladder never broke — not through COVID, rate hikes, or cuts
- Every other capital faltered — Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth all recorded quarters where more people moved down the property ladder than up
- Brisbane came closest to matching Melbourne's consistency, but still slipped into negative territory once
- Adelaide was the most volatile — its ladder was already breaking before rate hikes even began
- With rates back at 4.10% and rising, Melbourne faces its first genuine test of whether its record is structural or simply untested at this level of pressure
Property market narratives tend to focus on price. Prices rose, prices fell, prices defied gravity, prices hit a ceiling.
But prices tell only part of the story of how Australians actually use the property market. The other part — whether people are moving to higher-value properties or lower-value ones when they relocate — reveals something price indices cannot: the underlying confidence and capacity of a city’s movers.
Six years of movement data from findamover.com.au, drawn from more than 250,000 moves across five capital cities between January 2020 and December 2025, tracks exactly that metric. Each move is classified by combining three data points against CoreLogic median property price data:
- the origin and destination suburb,
- the property type at both the origin and destination (house, townhouse, unit),
- the number of bedrooms at both the origin and destination.
A move that results in a higher estimated property value is recorded as an upward move.
Where the estimated values of origin and destination fall within 10 per cent of each other, the move is classified as lateral — counted in total move volume but neither higher nor lower value.
The result is a quarterly measure of property ladder movement for each city — and across six years the five cities tell strikingly different stories.
What the metric shows
The property ladder gap is calculated as the percentage of higher-value moves minus the percentage of lower-value moves in a given quarter.
A positive figure means more people are trading up when they move.
A negative figure means the reverse — more movers are moving to a lower estimated property value than they left.
That can mean relocating to a lower-median suburb, but it can equally mean moving from a house to an apartment, from a four-bedroom home to a three-bedroom, or from a larger property to a smaller one in the same street. Any move that results in a lower estimated property value counts as a downward move. It is a signal of financial stress, reduced aspiration, or both.
The dataset spans three distinct rate environments:
- the emergency-low rate era of 2020 to early 2022,
- the aggressive tightening cycle that took the cash rate from 0.10 to 4.35 percent by late 2023,
- and the subsequent cutting cycle through 2025.
Back-to-back hikes in February and March 2026 have since reversed most of that relief, returning the cash rate to 4.10 percent. The data provides a clear template for what each of those environments means for movers on the ground.
Property ladder gap — before and after rate hikes, by city
Average gap between higher-value and lower-value move share across two periods. Solid bars = pre-hike average (Jan 2020–Apr 2022). Faded bars = post-hike average (May 2022–Dec 2025). Every city moved down. Not every city moved down equally.
City by city: the same rates, very different outcomes
All five cities faced identical RBA decisions across the six-year period. The variation in outcomes — visible in the chart above — reflects differences in pre-existing affordability, local economic drivers, and the structural depth of each market. What follows is a city-by-city account of what the data shows.
Adelaide: already fragile before hikes began
Adelaide is the most volatile market in the dataset and the only city that was already showing signs of structural weakness before the rate hike cycle began. It recorded three negative quarters in the pre-hike era — more than any other city — suggesting affordability pressures were embedded well before monetary tightening. A key driver is Adelaide’s smaller dollar gap between entry-level, mid-tier and premium homes, which encourages households to stretch more aggressively when moving up the ladder. That narrower upgrade gap means even small changes in mortgage repayments, living costs or borrowing capacity can quickly push upgrade decisions out of reach, making transaction volumes and moving activity more sensitive to shifts in household finances.
Through the hike peak Adelaide averaged just +0.2 percent — barely above parity — with four negative quarters. The cutting cycle brought modest improvement but with continued volatility. Adelaide’s ladder has never sustained a long run of consistently positive quarters in this dataset, regardless of the rate environment.
Adelaide — quarterly property ladder gap vs RBA cash rate
Quarterly average gap. The most volatile market — negative quarters appeared even before hikes began.
| Quarter | Higher value % | Lower value % | Gap | RBA rate % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 Q1 | 38.9% | 37.5% | +1.4% | 0.67% |
| 2020 Q2 | 38.5% | 39% | -0.5% | 0.25% |
| 2020 Q3 | 38.7% | 38.4% | +0.3% | 0.25% |
| 2020 Q4 | 40.4% | 38.7% | +1.7% | 0.15% |
| 2021 Q1 | 37.6% | 41.2% | -3.6% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q2 | 41.3% | 36.5% | +4.8% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q3 | 38.9% | 35.4% | +3.5% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q4 | 38.7% | 40.3% | -1.6% | 0.1% |
| 2022 Q1 | 46.1% | 36.3% | +9.8% | 0.1% |
| 2022 Q2 | 48.1% | 35.1% | +13% | 0.43% |
| 2022 Q3 | 41.1% | 41.6% | -0.5% | 1.85% |
| 2022 Q4 | 35.5% | 40.4% | -4.9% | 2.85% |
| 2023 Q1 | 38.8% | 39.2% | -0.4% | 3.35% |
| 2023 Q2 | 35.4% | 45.6% | -10.2% | 3.85% |
| 2023 Q3 | 43.2% | 38.9% | +4.3% | 4.1% |
| 2023 Q4 | 40.5% | 40.4% | +0.1% | 4.27% |
| 2024 Q1 | 40.1% | 36.3% | +3.8% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q2 | 38.7% | 40.9% | -2.2% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q3 | 40.1% | 39.5% | +0.6% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q4 | 40.5% | 39.7% | +0.8% | 4.35% |
| 2025 Q1 | 49.1% | 48.8% | +0.3% | 4.27% |
| 2025 Q2 | 54.1% | 44% | +10.1% | 3.77% |
| 2025 Q3 | 49.3% | 48.8% | +0.5% | 3.68% |
| 2025 Q4 | 44.8% | 53.9% | -9.1% | 3.93% |
Sydney: thin buffer, not yet recovered
Sydney entered the rate hike cycle with a pre-hike quarterly average of +4.7 percent — the second lowest of the eastern capitals. By 2024, that buffer had been fully consumed. Sydney recorded four negative quarters in total, three of them in 2024 and 2025 after rate cuts had begun — suggesting the damage from the hike cycle continued to work through the market even as relief was supposed to arrive. Its 2024 annual average of -0.8 percent was the only negative annual figure recorded by any city across the full dataset.
Sydney’s worst quarter was -4.6 percent in Q4 2024 — during the cutting cycle, not at the peak of hikes. The city enters the 2026 hike cycle with its property ladder barely in positive territory on average and no meaningful buffer to absorb further pressure.
Sydney — quarterly property ladder gap vs RBA cash rate
Quarterly average gap. Sydney held through most of the hike cycle but deteriorated sharply through 2024.
| Quarter | Higher value % | Lower value % | Gap | RBA rate % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 Q1 | 42.8% | 39.3% | +3.5% | 0.67% |
| 2020 Q2 | 45.1% | 37.3% | +7.8% | 0.25% |
| 2020 Q3 | 42.5% | 38.4% | +4.1% | 0.25% |
| 2020 Q4 | 46.4% | 35.1% | +11.3% | 0.15% |
| 2021 Q1 | 42.4% | 39.4% | +3% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q2 | 41.7% | 38% | +3.7% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q3 | 41.5% | 37.7% | +3.8% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q4 | 43% | 39% | +4% | 0.1% |
| 2022 Q1 | 41.7% | 40.3% | +1.4% | 0.1% |
| 2022 Q2 | 40.6% | 38.2% | +2.4% | 0.43% |
| 2022 Q3 | 42.1% | 38.3% | +3.8% | 1.85% |
| 2022 Q4 | 44.9% | 37.9% | +7% | 2.85% |
| 2023 Q1 | 42.3% | 40.1% | +2.2% | 3.35% |
| 2023 Q2 | 43.6% | 40.3% | +3.3% | 3.85% |
| 2023 Q3 | 41.1% | 40% | +1.1% | 4.1% |
| 2023 Q4 | 40% | 41.8% | -1.8% | 4.27% |
| 2024 Q1 | 41.7% | 40.7% | +1% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q2 | 42.7% | 40.7% | +2% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q3 | 41% | 42.6% | -1.6% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q4 | 39.2% | 43.9% | -4.7% | 4.35% |
| 2025 Q1 | 40.8% | 42.2% | -1.4% | 4.27% |
| 2025 Q2 | 41.9% | 39.2% | +2.7% | 3.77% |
| 2025 Q3 | 42.6% | 37.7% | +4.9% | 3.68% |
| 2025 Q4 | 41.4% | 40.1% | +1.3% | 3.93% |
Perth: peaks and troughs, not consistency
Perth recorded some of the highest individual quarterly readings in the entire dataset — +14.1 percent in 2020 Q3, +13.3 percent in 2022 Q3, +13.1 percent in 2024 Q4. The resources sector economy provided genuine insulation through much of the rate hike cycle, and Perth’s hike-peak average of +4.3 percent was the strongest of any city during that period.
But Perth also recorded seven negative quarters — more than any city except Adelaide. Its worst reading, -4.2 percent in Q1 2025, came during the cutting cycle. The pattern is consistent with a resource-sector driven economy: exceptional when conditions align, volatile when they don’t. Perth’s ladder works spectacularly in good times and retreats sharply when sector conditions shift.
Perth — quarterly property ladder gap vs RBA cash rate
Quarterly average gap. High peaks and sharp troughs — the highest variance market in the dataset.
| Quarter | Higher value % | Lower value % | Gap | RBA rate % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 Q1 | 42.3% | 36.8% | +5.5% | 0.67% |
| 2020 Q2 | 38.8% | 40.4% | -1.6% | 0.25% |
| 2020 Q3 | 48.3% | 34.2% | +14.1% | 0.25% |
| 2020 Q4 | 46.8% | 35.8% | +11% | 0.15% |
| 2021 Q1 | 43% | 35.5% | +7.5% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q2 | 43.2% | 38% | +5.2% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q3 | 43.5% | 32.9% | +10.6% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q4 | 45.3% | 34.8% | +10.5% | 0.1% |
| 2022 Q1 | 41.2% | 41.9% | -0.7% | 0.1% |
| 2022 Q2 | 44% | 37.9% | +6.1% | 0.43% |
| 2022 Q3 | 45.3% | 32% | +13.3% | 1.85% |
| 2022 Q4 | 41.4% | 42.1% | -0.7% | 2.85% |
| 2023 Q1 | 46.2% | 38.2% | +8% | 3.35% |
| 2023 Q2 | 42.2% | 34.6% | +7.6% | 3.85% |
| 2023 Q3 | 41.1% | 42.2% | -1.1% | 4.1% |
| 2023 Q4 | 36.8% | 39.7% | -2.9% | 4.27% |
| 2024 Q1 | 43.6% | 35.5% | +8.1% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q2 | 45.7% | 35.2% | +10.5% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q3 | 44.5% | 36.6% | +7.9% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q4 | 44.6% | 31.5% | +13.1% | 4.35% |
| 2025 Q1 | 35.6% | 39.8% | -4.2% | 4.27% |
| 2025 Q2 | 39.9% | 41.5% | -1.6% | 3.77% |
| 2025 Q3 | 40.2% | 39.4% | +0.8% | 3.68% |
| 2025 Q4 | 45.6% | 36.6% | +9% | 3.93% |
Brisbane: consistent without being spectacular
Brisbane recorded zero negative quarters in the pre-hike period and — notably — zero negative quarters during the entire rate hike peak from May 2022 to December 2023. While Sydney and Adelaide were recording negative readings through the hike cycle, Brisbane held positive throughout, aided by relative affordability and strong interstate migration.
The cutting cycle produced one negative quarter and a +3.8 percent average — a genuine partial recovery. Brisbane’s ladder did not break during the previous rate cycle. It is worth noting that staying positive does not mean staying strong. Brisbane’s hike-peak average of +2.7 percent was well below its pre-hike average of +7.6 percent — the ladder kept moving, but at a slower pace.
Brisbane — quarterly property ladder gap vs RBA cash rate
Quarterly average gap. Zero negative quarters through the entire hike peak period.
| Quarter | Higher value % | Lower value % | Gap | RBA rate % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 Q1 | 44.9% | 36.2% | +8.7% | 0.67% |
| 2020 Q2 | 45.8% | 33.7% | +12.1% | 0.25% |
| 2020 Q3 | 46.4% | 35.5% | +10.9% | 0.25% |
| 2020 Q4 | 44.8% | 36.9% | +7.9% | 0.15% |
| 2021 Q1 | 43.5% | 37.4% | +6.1% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q2 | 44.5% | 36.1% | +8.4% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q3 | 42.5% | 34.6% | +7.9% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q4 | 41.9% | 39.4% | +2.5% | 0.1% |
| 2022 Q1 | 41.7% | 37.7% | +4% | 0.1% |
| 2022 Q2 | 39.5% | 37.6% | +1.9% | 0.43% |
| 2022 Q3 | 40.5% | 38.2% | +2.3% | 1.85% |
| 2022 Q4 | 42.7% | 39.5% | +3.2% | 2.85% |
| 2023 Q1 | 40.1% | 39.4% | +0.7% | 3.35% |
| 2023 Q2 | 43.3% | 36.9% | +6.4% | 3.85% |
| 2023 Q3 | 37.8% | 36.4% | +1.4% | 4.1% |
| 2023 Q4 | 42.4% | 39.4% | +3% | 4.27% |
| 2024 Q1 | 44.1% | 37.3% | +6.8% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q2 | 40.7% | 36.1% | +4.6% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q3 | 43.1% | 36.5% | +6.6% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q4 | 43.7% | 37% | +6.7% | 4.35% |
| 2025 Q1 | 42.1% | 35.5% | +6.6% | 4.27% |
| 2025 Q2 | 35.6% | 42.1% | -6.5% | 3.77% |
| 2025 Q3 | 41.2% | 39.1% | +2.1% | 3.68% |
| 2025 Q4 | 41.4% | 38% | +3.4% | 3.93% |
Melbourne: the outlier
Look at the data long enough and one city stands apart. Melbourne recorded a positive property ladder gap in every single quarter across the full six-year dataset — 24 consecutive quarters. Its pre-hike average of +9.4 percent was the strongest of any city. Through the hike peak it averaged +7.4 percent — still the strongest, and nearly three times Brisbane’s hike-period average. Through the cutting cycle it averaged +4.4 percent. Its worst quarter, Q4 2024, was +1.8 percent.
Not once in six years did lower-value moves outnumber higher-value moves in Melbourne. Not through COVID. Not through back-to-back rate hikes. Not through the cutting cycle. While every other capital recorded at least one quarter where the ladder went into reverse — Adelaide nine times, Perth seven, Sydney four, Brisbane once — Melbourne’s record is unbroken.
Melbourne — quarterly property ladder gap vs RBA cash rate (2020–2025)
Every bar is positive. 24 consecutive quarters of higher-value move dominance. Dashed grey = RBA cash rate (right axis).
| Quarter | Higher value % | Lower value % | Gap | RBA rate % |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 Q1 | 47.9% | 35% | +12.9% | 0.67% |
| 2020 Q2 | 46.2% | 33.9% | +12.3% | 0.25% |
| 2020 Q3 | 46.4% | 35.8% | +10.6% | 0.25% |
| 2020 Q4 | 47% | 35% | +12% | 0.15% |
| 2021 Q1 | 43.9% | 37.7% | +6.2% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q2 | 44.6% | 36.2% | +8.4% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q3 | 42.6% | 37.4% | +5.2% | 0.1% |
| 2021 Q4 | 45.4% | 36.1% | +9.3% | 0.1% |
| 2022 Q1 | 44.9% | 37% | +7.9% | 0.1% |
| 2022 Q2 | 42.9% | 36.5% | +6.4% | 0.43% |
| 2022 Q3 | 43.6% | 35.7% | +7.9% | 1.85% |
| 2022 Q4 | 46.2% | 38.2% | +8% | 2.85% |
| 2023 Q1 | 44.9% | 37.1% | +7.8% | 3.35% |
| 2023 Q2 | 42.3% | 38.7% | +3.6% | 3.85% |
| 2023 Q3 | 45.1% | 35.2% | +9.9% | 4.1% |
| 2023 Q4 | 44.9% | 36.8% | +8.1% | 4.27% |
| 2024 Q1 | 42.9% | 39.3% | +3.6% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q2 | 45.2% | 37.7% | +7.5% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q3 | 42.2% | 37.5% | +4.7% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q4 | 40.4% | 38.6% | +1.8% | 4.35% |
| 2025 Q1 | 43.9% | 37.8% | +6.1% | 4.27% |
| 2025 Q2 | 41.4% | 39.6% | +1.8% | 3.77% |
| 2025 Q3 | 42.2% | 37.4% | +4.8% | 3.68% |
| 2025 Q4 | 42.4% | 37.8% | +4.6% | 3.93% |
24 from 24 quarters positive
How Melbourne compared to each city
Melbourne's positive record is one thing. How it compared to every other city quarter by quarter tells the fuller story. The table below shows, across all 24 quarters, how often Melbourne recorded a higher property ladder gap than each other capital — and by how much on average.
Melbourne vs Sydney
Melbourne ahead
22 / 24
Sydney ahead
2 / 24
Melbourne avg
+7.1%
Sydney avg
+2.6%
Melbourne vs Adelaide
Melbourne ahead
20 / 24
Adelaide ahead
4 / 24
Melbourne avg
+7.1%
Adelaide avg
+0.9%
Melbourne vs Brisbane
Melbourne ahead
16 / 24
Brisbane ahead
8 / 24
Melbourne avg
+7.1%
Brisbane avg
+4.7%
Melbourne vs Perth
Melbourne ahead
12 / 24
Perth ahead
12 / 24
Melbourne avg
+7.1%
Perth avg
+5.5%
The Perth comparison is worth pausing on. Perth matched Melbourne in 12 quarters and beat it in the same number — but Perth achieved this through a pattern of high peaks and deep troughs, recording seven negative quarters against Melbourne's zero. Perth's best quarter (+14.1% in 2020 Q3) beat Melbourne's best. But its worst quarter (-4.2% in 2025 Q1) has no equivalent in Melbourne's data. The contrast illustrates the difference between a city with high variance and one with structural consistency.
Why did Melbourne hold when others didn’t?
The data establishes the finding clearly. What the data cannot do is prove why. The following three structural hypotheses are offered as possible explanations consistent with the data — not as proven conclusions. Confirming any of them would require additional analysis beyond moving patterns alone.
Hypothesis 1 - Relative affordability created continuous intermediate rungs
Melbourne significantly underperformed Sydney and Brisbane during the 2021–2023 property boom. By the time rates peaked, Melbourne's median property value had not run as far ahead of incomes as Sydney's. The practical effect is that the dollar gap between a two-bedroom and a three-bedroom, or between a unit and a house, remained bridgeable for a larger share of the population. Sydney's median has risen to a level where many of those steps have become financially unreachable, effectively removing rungs from the middle of the ladder. The data is consistent with this — Melbourne's ladder kept moving precisely when Sydney's was stalling.
Hypothesis 2 - Economic diversity sustained a broader base of upgraders
Melbourne's economy spans education, healthcare, professional services, technology and manufacturing. Perth's ladder is more exposed to resources sector cycles — evident in its seven negative quarters, including a sharp reversal in early 2025. Sydney's has a higher concentration in financial services, where bonus cycles and sector downturns translate quickly into reduced upgrading activity. A more diversified employment base means that at any given point, a broader share of the workforce is in a position to move up — insulating the ladder from sector-specific shocks. Again, this is consistent with the data but would require employment and income analysis beyond what is available here to confirm directly.
Hypothesis 3 - Deep market liquidity maintained ladder velocity
Melbourne is Australia's second most populous city and has consistently been its highest-transaction-volume property market. High liquidity means that even under rate pressure, there are enough buyers and sellers at each price point to keep the ladder moving. In thinner markets, a reduction in buyer confidence at one price tier can seize up the whole ladder — there is no one to sell to at the next rung up. Melbourne's depth may mean the ladder kept turning over even when confidence was compressed, whereas smaller or more concentrated markets froze more readily.
The full record: property ladder gap by city, every quarter
| Quarter | Melbourne | Sydney | Brisbane | Adelaide | Perth | RBA rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 Q1 | +12.8% | +3.5% | +8.7% | +1.5% | +5.5% | 0.67% |
| 2020 Q2 | +12.3% | +7.8% | +12.1% | -0.5% | -1.6% | 0.25% |
| 2020 Q3 | +10.6% | +4.1% | +10.9% | +0.4% | +14.1% | 0.25% |
| 2020 Q4 | +11.9% | +11.3% | +7.9% | +1.6% | +10.9% | 0.15% |
| 2021 Q1 | +6.2% | +3.0% | +6.1% | -3.6% | +7.5% | 0.10% |
| 2021 Q2 | +8.3% | +3.7% | +8.4% | +4.8% | +5.1% | 0.10% |
| 2021 Q3 | +5.2% | +3.8% | +8.0% | +3.5% | +10.6% | 0.10% |
| 2021 Q4 | +9.2% | +4.0% | +2.5% | -1.7% | +10.5% | 0.10% |
| 2022 Q1 | +7.9% | +1.4% | +4.0% | +9.9% | -0.7% | 0.10% |
| 2022 Q2 | +6.4% | +2.4% | +1.8% | +13.0% | +6.1% | 0.43% |
| 2022 Q3 | +7.9% | +3.7% | +2.3% | -0.5% | +13.3% | 1.85% |
| 2022 Q4 | +8.0% | +7.1% | +3.2% | -4.9% | -0.7% | 2.85% |
| 2023 Q1 | +7.8% | +2.2% | +0.6% | -0.4% | +8.1% | 3.35% |
| 2023 Q2 | +3.6% | +3.3% | +6.4% | -10.3% | +7.6% | 3.85% |
| 2023 Q3 | +9.9% | +1.1% | +1.4% | +4.3% | -1.1% | 4.10% |
| 2023 Q4 | +8.0% | -1.8% | +3.0% | +0.2% | -2.9% | 4.27% |
| 2024 Q1 | +3.6% | +1.0% | +6.8% | +3.8% | +8.1% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q2 | +7.5% | +2.0% | +4.7% | -2.2% | +10.4% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q3 | +4.7% | -1.6% | +6.5% | +0.6% | +7.9% | 4.35% |
| 2024 Q4 | +1.8% | -4.6% | +6.7% | +0.9% | +13.1% | 4.35% |
| 2025 Q1 | +6.1% | -1.5% | +6.6% | +0.3% | -4.2% | 4.27% |
| 2025 Q2 | +1.8% | +2.7% | -6.5% | +10.1% | -1.6% | 3.77% |
| 2025 Q3 | +4.8% | +4.9% | +2.1% | +0.5% | +0.8% | 3.68% |
| 2025 Q4 | +4.6% | +1.2% | +3.4% | -9.1% | +8.9% | 3.93% |
What this means for 2026
Back-to-back RBA hikes in February and March 2026 have returned the cash rate to 4.10 percent — matching the level at which, in the previous cycle, most cities began recording their worst readings. CBA economists have flagged a possible third consecutive hike in May. The historical record across all five cities provides a clear template for what tends to follow.
Adelaide and Sydney are the most exposed. Both enter 2026 with property ladder averages barely above zero from the cutting cycle, and neither demonstrated the structural resilience in the previous hike cycle that would suggest they can absorb further pressure comfortably. Brisbane and Perth showed genuine resilience through the previous cycle and enter 2026 from stronger positions, though Perth’s volatility makes it difficult to forecast with confidence.
For Melbourne, the question the data cannot yet answer is whether its unbroken record is structural or simply untested at a sustained level of pressure. Its cutting-cycle average of +4.4 percent is the strongest of any city but below its own hike-peak average of +7.4 percent — the buffer has compressed. With rates back at 4.10 per cent and potentially rising, 2026 will test whether what the data shows is a permanent characteristic of Melbourne’s property market, or a record that was waiting for conditions hard enough to break it.
Can Melbourne's record hold?
Methodology
This analysis is based on movement data collected by findamover.com.au across more than 250,000 moves in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth between January 2020 and December 2025.
How moves are classified. Each move is classified as higher-value, lower-value or same-value using three combined data points: the origin and destination suburb (matched against CoreLogic suburb-level median price data), the property type (house, townhouse, or unit), and the number of bedrooms. The estimated property value is derived from the intersection of these three variables. A move that results in a higher estimated value — whether driven by a change in suburb, property type, size, or a combination — is recorded as a higher-value move. The reverse is a lower-value move. Moves where the estimated property values of origin and destination fall within 10 percent of each other are classified as same-value moves. These moves are included in the total move count — which forms the denominator of each percentage — but are not counted toward either the higher-value or lower-value side of the gap. This threshold accounts for natural variation in suburb-level medians and ensures the higher-value and lower-value classifications reflect meaningful directional movement rather than marginal price differences. This approach means a move from a two-bedroom unit to a three-bedroom house in the same suburb is captured as an upward move, while a move from a four-bedroom house in a high-median suburb to a two-bedroom unit in a lower-median suburb is captured as a downward move even if the suburb change alone might suggest otherwise. The property ladder gap is then calculated as the percentage of higher-value moves minus the percentage of lower-value moves in a given period. A positive figure indicates more movers were trading up; a negative figure indicates the reverse.
Owner-occupiers and renters. The dataset captures all residential moves facilitated through findamover.com.au, including both owner-occupiers and renters. This is intentional. A renter relocating from a lower-median suburb to a higher-median suburb reflects the same upward aspiration and financial capacity as an owner-occupier doing the same — and is subject to the same cost-of-living and rate pressures. Rental costs in higher-value suburbs rise alongside property prices, meaning renters face similar affordability constraint. Including renters makes the dataset a fuller barometer of housing mobility across the whole population rather than a narrower measure of owner-occupier behaviour only. Readers should note, however, that a higher-value move by a renter does not imply equity accumulation — the metric measures the direction of residential mobility, not wealth creation.
Periods and averages. Three rate periods are referenced: the pre-hike era (Q1 2020 to Q1 2022, nine quarters), the rate hike peak (Q2 2022 to Q4 2023, seven quarters), and the cutting cycle (Q1 2024 to Q4 2025, eight quarters). All quarterly figures represent averages of monthly data within that quarter. Overall period averages are simple means of quarterly averages within each period.
Hypotheses. The three structural hypotheses offered in this article — relative affordability, economic diversity, and market liquidity — are consistent with the data but are not proven by it. Confirming any of them would require additional data sources beyond moving patterns, including employment composition, property supply pipelines, and household income data. findamover.com.au makes no claim beyond what the movement data directly demonstrates.
Sources
RBA cash rate history
https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/cash-rate/
CoreLogic suburb median price data
https://www.corelogic.com.au/
RBA March 2026 rate decision (official statement)
https://www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2026/mr-26-08.html
CBA economists forecasting third hike in May 2026
https://www.commbank.com.au/articles/newsroom/2026/02/commbank-economists-on-the-rba-interest-rate-decision.html
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